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As the 111th Congress begins and a new president takes office, the 
economic crisis dominates the US policy agenda. The financial 
system remains in a tenuous state despite massive bank recapi-
talization, and the economy, more than a year into the current 
recession, shows no signs of recovery. Given the scale of the chal-
lenge Washington faces and the amount of money required to 
combat it, there will likely be little room for other legislative 
priorities. As a result, policymakers are hoping to direct govern-
ment spending over the next two years in a way that not only 
generates short-term economic growth and employment but also 
addresses long-term policy goals sidelined by the current crisis.1 
Energy and environmental objectives are chief among these 
goals, as evidenced by the considerable attention given to the 
notion of a green economic recovery by policymakers and the 
press. This policy brief provides a framework for evaluating ways 
to meet energy and climate policy goals as part of an economic 
recovery effort, assesses a range of policy options currently under 
consideration, and discusses the prospects for coordinating US 
actions with those of other major economies for broader effect.
In light of this analysis, we argue that:
n  Well-tailored,  green  components  of  a  recovery  effort  can 
create  jobs  and  stimulate  the  economy  while  achieving 
significant energy cost savings for businesses, consumers, and 
the government. On average, for every billion dollars invested 
our green recovery scenarios create 30,100 jobs and save the 
economy $450 million per year in energy costs. These future 
savings can serve as a sort of “efficiency pay-go” for govern-
ment outlays today.
n  A green stimulus is no replacement for comprehensive climate 
and energy policy. Even the most aggressive short-term spend-
ing will have only a modest impact on US greenhouse gas   
emissions and dependence on foreign sources of energy. On 
average, our green policy scenarios reduce annual CO2 emis-
sions by 592,600 tons for every billion dollars spent. Scaling 
this investment and focusing funding on programs with the 
1. See, for example, President Barack Obama’s weekly radio address from January 
24, 2009, available at www.whitehouse.gov (accessed on February 2, 2009); Mike 
Allen, “Pelosi sees bigger, greener stimulus,” Politico.com, December 12, 2008, 
available at www.politico.com (accessed on February 2, 2009).
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highest return could increase this amount, but would still 
fall far short of the billions of tons of reductions necessary 
to stabilize the climate. 
n  Although  green  recovery  efforts  alone  will  not  achieve 
broader climate and energy objectives, they can reduce the 
cost of comprehensive climate and energy policy. The most 
successful programs will be those that can be implemented 
quickly and can complement, rather than seek to replace, 
future energy and climate-specific legislation.2 
n  Internationally, the response to the current economic crisis 
provides an opportunity to lay the foundation for, and 
build confidence in, a multilateral approach to the climate 
crisis at the UN-led negotiations in Copenhagen later this 
year. When G-20 leaders meet in London in April, they 
should seek to coordinate green components of national 
stimulus  programs  and  take  stock  of  how  these  efforts 
impact long-term emissions reduction goals.
CONTEXT: THE CASE FOR A GREEN ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY
The push for including energy and environmental programs in 
an economic recovery effort is driven primarily by two consid-
erations. The first, as mentioned above, is that responding to 
the current economic crisis will likely monopolize the legisla-
tive agenda for at least the first part of 2009. If energy security 
or climate change (or healthcare or education) policy is not 
in the cards for President Obama’s first 100 days in office, 
then policymakers would like to see those priorities reflected 
in  an  economic  recovery  package.  The  second  is  the  view 
that given the US consumer’s new-found propensity to save, 
direct government investments in infrastructure will provide 
a more effective stimulus than tax cuts (Zandi 2009).3 And 
if infrastructure investment is in order, recent reports argue 
that more jobs will be created if that investment goes toward 
renewable energy and mass transit, rather than fossil fuels and 
road construction (Pollin et al. 2008). 
In our view, the logic for a green economic stimulus is a 
bit  different  from  these  political  concerns.  As  demonstrated 
below, spending even $100 billion on energy and environmental 
programs as part of an economic recovery package would be far 
from sufficient to meet energy security and emissions reduction 
2. See Trevor Houser, “Structuring a Green Recovery: Evaluating Policy Op-
tions for an Economic Stimulus Package,” testimony before the House Select 
Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, January 15, 2009, 
available at www.petersoninstitute.org (accessed on February 2, 2009).
3. See also Douglas W. Elmendorf, “The State of the Economy and Issues in 
Developing an Effective Policy Response,” testimony before the Committee on 
the Budget, US House of Representatives, January 27, 2009.
goals. These are long-term challenges that require comprehensive 
and well-planned energy and climate policy to solve. Because 
cap-and-trade programs, carbon taxes, or other policies fitting 
this description are unlikely to take effect until 2013, there is little 
economic rational for delaying necessary changes to our energy 
system. The primary value of a green recovery is neither as a 
substitute for dedicated energy and climate policy, nor as a better 
driver of jobs growth than the alternative (although some poli-
cies would be, as discussed below). Rather, well-designed green 
components of a recovery effort have the potential to reduce the 
future cost of such long-term policies and can help to mitigate 
their impact on the US economy early into its recovery. 
Investments in energy efficiency will reduce costs imme-
diately, as cheaper gas and power bills enable households to 
keep more of their income and the government to offset new 
debt obligations with lower energy expenditures. To the extent 
that foregone energy spending is channeled elsewhere in the 
economy,  efficiency  investments  combine  the  employment 
benefits  of  both  building  infrastructure  and  cutting  taxes. 
These benefits continue long after the initial construction work 
has been completed and make repaying money borrowed to 
finance the recovery more manageable. Targeted investments 
in low-carbon energy technology and infrastructure can add 
to this by making long-term emissions reduction and energy 
security goals more affordable and achievable. 
FRAMEWORK: WHAT ENERGY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS MEET  
THE TEST?
Energy  and  environmental  investments  will  only  be  one 
component  of  broader  economic  recovery  efforts.  Govern-
ment spending of the scale currently being considered will 
necessarily include a broad range of elements, from tax cuts 
for households and assistance to states to direct government 
investment in infrastructure, education, and healthcare. Given 
limited resources, competing demands, and the need to maxi-
mize both the economic and environmental benefits of any 
green component, a framework for assessing possible options 
is required. In this policy brief we evaluate twelve potential 
energy-related programs in terms of:
n  Speed: how quickly the program can be implemented at 
scale;
n  Jobs: the number of jobs created directly, in supplier indus-
tries, and through paychecks spent in local economies;
n  Energy Prices: the impact on energy demand and prices 
both for the program’s recipient(s) and the country as a 
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n  Energy Security: reduction in US dependence on import-
ed fossil fuels;4
n  Climate Change: change in CO2 emissions in both the 
short and medium terms.
As  any  energy  import  and  CO2  emissions  reductions 
achieved from green recovery efforts alone will be modest, we 
look at how these programs can complement future policy by 
focusing on: 
n  Market Failures: There are a number of low-cost (or even 
profitable)  opportunities  to  reduce  energy  demand  and 
CO2 emissions through energy efficiency that will likely 
not respond to price-based climate policy alone. Further-
more, reducing dependence on foreign oil is a policy objec-
tive that price-based climate policies will not necessarily 
address (although price-based energy policies like a gasoline 
tax could). Targeted government spending can tackle issues 
that future climate regimes might miss. 
n  Technology Hurdles: Uncertainty about the availability of 
critical low-carbon energy technology between 2012 and 
2030 creates anxiety about the future cost of climate policy. 
Similarly, high barriers to technological change in trans-
portation make weaning the country off foreign sources of 
energy an expensive undertaking. Policy adopted today can 
help accelerate technology development and cut the cost of 
reducing emissions and oil imports down the road. 
n  Infrastructure  Bottlenecks:  In  addition  to  reduced 
costs, the deployment of low-carbon technology and the 
facilitation of less oil-dependent lifestyles depend on the 
availability of enabling infrastructure. Whether electricity 
transmission, CO2 pipelines, or mass transit, the govern-
ment will necessarily have a role in building and regulating 
the infrastructure that facilitates future energy and climate 
goals. Many of those investments can begin today.
While the green programs evaluated in our study would have 
a direct impact on US energy demand and carbon emissions, 
other potential elements of an economic recovery package could 
do so as well. Money will be spent on improving and expanding 
roads, bridges, and highways, as well as renewable energy and 
4. Energy security impacts, for the purposes of this analysis, are represented 
by US dependence on imported fossil fuels. However, this is a fairly limited 
definition. While it addresses a key political concern—energy imports, 
particularly imported oil—there are important components of energy security 
not captured in this narrow definition. A traditional definition of energy 
security includes not only adequacy of (domestic) supply, but also reliability 
and affordability. The definition can be further expanded to include the long-
term sustainability of energy choices. These considerations are not thoroughly 
captured in the modeling discussed here, as fossil-fuel dependence is used as a 
proxy for this broader set of concerns.
mass transit infrastructure (Office of the President-Elect 2009). 
We also evaluate investments that, while not conceived of as 
energy and environmental programs, would have a meaningful 
impact on the country’s energy and environmental footprint.
SCENARIOS: POTENTIAL GREEN RECOVERY 
PROGRAMS
The policy scenarios analyzed in this plicy brief are drawn 
from  conversations  with  policymakers,  nongovernmental 
organizations  (NGOs),  industry  groups,  and  academics 
between November 2008 and January 2009 about the types 
of programs being advocated and considered as part of an 
economic recovery package. We opted for a representative set 
of policy proposals rather than an exhaustive list of possible 
options. Below is a brief description of each. 
1.  Household  Weatherization:  Install  insulation,  new 
windows, and better light bulbs in residential dwellings. 
2.  Federal Building Efficiency: Retrofit federal buildings to 
reduce overall energy demand. 
3.  Green Schools: Provide funding to ensure that new school 
construction and renovations of existing facilities are high 
efficiency.
4.  Production Tax Credit: Promote the deployment of grid-
connected  renewable  energy  through  extension  of  the 
production tax credit (PTC).
5.  Investment Tax Credit: Bolster incentives for installing 
distributed  renewable  generation  options  in  businesses 
and households through an increase in the investment tax 
credit (ITC).
6.  CCS Demonstration Projects: Fund carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) demonstration projects around the country.
7.  Cash  for  Clunkers:  Provide  a  tax  credit  toward  the 
purchase of a new or used high-efficiency vehicle when an 
older and less–fuel efficient vehicle is retired.5
8.  Hybrid  Tax  Credit:  Provide  a  tax  credit  toward  the 
purchase of a new hybrid vehicle.
9.  Mass Transit Investment: Fund “shovel ready” mass tran-
sit projects.
10. Battery R&D: Fund strategic investment in the research, 
development, and deployment of advanced battery systems 
aimed at meeting FreedomCAR goals for reducing cost and 
weight.6
5. The term “Cash for Clunkers” does not refer to a specific policy design; our 
Cash for Clunkers scenario is based on ACEEE (2009). See appendix for a 
complete description of the methodology used. 
6. For information on the US Department of Energy’s FreedomCAR program, 
see Howell (2007).N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 3   Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 9
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11.  Smart Metering: Provide matching funds to upgrade elec-
tricity metering, enabling users to better control energy 
costs  and  allowing  utilities  to  more  effectively  manage 
demand. 
12.  Transmission: Construct high-voltage transmission lines 
to allow for greater renewable energy penetration.
We tried to construct each scenario in a way that reflected 
likely policy design while still allowing for flexibility in inter-
preting the findings. For example, in our production tax credit 
scenario, we extend the PTC to measure the impact of greater 
wind deployment on CO2 emissions and energy prices. Given 
current economic conditions, policymakers may opt for loan 
guarantees or grants as an alternative form of incentive. As 
long as the cost-sharing ratio between government and the 
private  sector  remains  constant,  the  findings  below  should 
still be applicable. A complete description of the assumptions 
used to construct each policy scenario can be found in the 
appendix.
GREEN RECOVERY METRICS
The twelve programs listed above vary considerably in imple-
mentation time, impact on the economy and employment, 
cost  certainty,  and  compatibility  with  future  energy  and 
environmental policy. A qualitative assessment of these green 
recovery options, relative to each other and to tax cuts and 
traditional infrastructure investments, can be found in table 1. 
For a quantitative comparison (table 2), we list job creation, 
energy savings, emissions cuts, and energy import reductions 
per  billion  dollars  of  government  spending.  For  programs 
where government dollars are matched by private dollars (such 
as tax credits, demonstration projects, or some infrastructure 
investment) we list the ratio of public to private spending. 
Figures 1 through 3 depict these results graphically. In 
figure  2,  the  horizontal  axis  indicates  reduction  in  average 
annual energy expenditures between 2012 and 2020 for the 
country as a whole, measured in million 2007 US dollars. The 
vertical axis indicates reduction in average annual CO2 emis-
sions between 2012 and 2020, measured in thousand metric 
tons. The size of the bubble reflects the number of direct, indi-
rect, and induced jobs created in the year the money is spent. 
Figure 3 is similar, but depicts the reduction in net imports of 
oil (measured in thousand barrels per year) on the horizontal 
axis and the reduction in net imports of natural gas (measured 
in million cubic feet per year) on the vertical axis. Circle size 
again  indicates  job  creation  in  the  program  year.  Figure  1 
compares the number of jobs created while the investment is 
taking place with the number of jobs created in subsequent 
years from energy cost savings. 
While  evaluating  the  impact  of  each  program  per  $1 
billion spent is useful for comparative purposes, there are limits 
to how accurately these metrics can be used to estimate the 
absolute impact of specific spending amounts. The relation-
ship between program size and energy outcomes is not neces-
sarily linear. We modeled most scenarios at the $10 billion 
level (see appendix), and estimate that results are meaningful 
for programs between $5 billion and $30 billion. Outside that 
range, our model would need to be adjusted to reflect actual 
spending levels in order to provide reliable results.
CREATING JOBS AND LOWERING ENERGY 
BILLS
With US unemployment rising fast, policymakers’ primary 
goal with any economic recovery effort is job creation. There is 
considerable uncertainty about the extent to which any stimu-
lus strategy, whether tax cuts or direct government spending, 
will  boost  employment  in  the  current  economic  climate. 
Our assessment of the jobs potential of green recovery policy 
options (table 2) is intended for comparison purposes only 
and not as a predictor of future employment creation. The 
total number of jobs resulting in practice from any of these 
programs will depend on specific policy design decisions, the 
scale and speed with which they are implemented, and current 
consumer and firm responses to government incentives. We 
discuss some of these considerations later in this policy brief.
Most  of  the  green  policy  options  we  evaluated  score 
fairly well in terms of total job-years created per $1 billion 
in government spending (or $1 billion in foregone govern-
ment revenue) relative to nongreen policy alternatives.7 Both 
the Congressional Budget Office and leading economists have 
argued that in light of consumers’ current propensity to save, 
tax rebates will have less of an impact on the economy as a 
whole, and on job creation in particular, than direct govern-
ment spending, assuming both occur in the same time period 
(Zandi 2009).8 A recent survey of the January 2008 tax rebate 
recipients supports this analysis, finding that only one-third 
of the 2008 rebates were spent during that year (Shapiro and 
Slemrod  2008).  Using  this  assumption  and  BEA  estimates 
of employment multipliers of household spending, we esti-
mate that 7000 job-years are created for every $1 billion in 
7. We measure employment effects in “job-years” or the number of full-time 
equivalent jobs lasting one year. For example, an investment in building 
efficiency that created 25,000 jobs-years could mean 25,000 jobs sustained for 
one year or 5,000 jobs sustained for five years.
8. See also Douglas W. Elmendorf, “The State of the Economy and Issues in 
Developing an Effective Policy Response,” testimony before the Committee on 
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temporary tax cuts or rebates during the year in which the cuts 
occur. Permanent tax cuts, or rebates targeted at low-income 
households, are more likely to be spent and would yield higher 
job creation. In contrast, spending $1 billion on traditional 
infrastructure  investments  (our  road  construction  scenario) 
would create 25,200 jobs for the year in which the spend-
ing occurred. On average, our eleven modeled green scenarios 
would yield 30,100 jobs for every $1 billion in government 
spending (table 2).
The relatively high employment intensity of investment 
in green programs in our model, as compared to traditional 
infrastructure investments, is the result of two factors. First, 
tax credit–based scenarios like the PTC extension, the ITC 
increase, and Cash for Clunkers use public dollars to catalyze 
private spending. The job creation estimates in table 2 are the 
total employment effects of the tax credit, not just the share 
attributable to public dollars. If tax credits spur investment 
that would otherwise have been delayed, this is an appropri-
ate metric. If the tax credit simply redirects investment from 
other parts of the economy, then it is the labor intensity of 
the green investment versus other investment opportunities 
that is relevant. The same considerations hold for our CCS 
demonstration project and smart metering scenarios, where 
public dollars are matched by private spending. 
The second factor is the net employment effect of reduc-
ing energy costs to the economy as a whole. Since the oil, 
natural gas, and power generation sectors are less labor-inten-
sive and more import-dependent industries than other sectors, 
redirecting expenditures from energy to other types of goods 
and services creates jobs. In our model, we assume that 50 
percent of the energy savings to households and firms in the 
year in which the investment occurs are spent elsewhere in the 
economy. We therefore add the resulting employment effects 
to the number of jobs created by the investment itself. This is 
lower than the savings rate assumed for temporary tax cuts, 
as analysis suggests that households’ marginal propensity to 
consume is higher when the income change is seen as perma-
nent.9
Energy  efficiency  improvements  and  price  reductions 
resulting from green recovery efforts have employment bene-
fits that continue beyond the current crisis. While the jobs 
created by tax cuts and traditional infrastructure investment 
end once the money is spent, programs that reduce energy 
costs lead to net employment gains well into the future (figure 
1,  traditional  infrastructure  investments  and  spending  on 
social services like education and healthcare also create impor-
9. See, for example, Douglas W. Elmendorf, “The State of the Economy and 
Issues in Developing an Effective Policy Response,” testimony before the 
Committee on the Budget, US House of Representatives, January 27, 2009.
tant long-term economic benefits but quantitative analysis of 
these effects is outside the scope of this brief). This helps offset 
the cost of paying for stimulus spending down the road. For 
some programs, like retrofitting federal buildings, cost savings 
flow directly to the government and help offset future debt 
obligations. And by reducing the energy demand of federal 
buildings, energy costs decline economy wide. In our model, 
spending $1 billion on federal retrofits saves the government 
$130 million a year through improved efficiency and saves the 
rest of the economy $260 million a year by lowering energy 
prices.  On  average,  our  green  recovery  scenarios  save  the 
economy $450 million per year for every $1 billion invested, 
a sort of “efficiency pay-go” provision for current government 
spending. 
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
Evaluating the emissions reduction potential of various policy 
options means balancing short-term benefits with long-term 
climate policy objectives. For example, of the four transporta-
tion scenarios modeled, Cash for Clunkers and battery R&D 
yield significant emission reductions per government dollar 
spent, 1.1 million and 1.3 million tons annually per billion 
government dollars, respectively (table 2 and figure 2). Yet Cash 
for Clunkers is a one-off policy intervention, with diminishing 
climate returns over time. The benefits of reducing battery cost 
and weight, on the other hand, grow exponentially over time, 
particularly if future climate policy creates incentives for plug-
in hybrid adoption. The results of battery R&D, however, are 
less certain, as our scenario assumes an innovation outcome 
(i.e., meeting FreedomCAR goals) that may not be possible 
through $1 billion in government spending. 
Among the power-generation scenarios, extension of the 
production tax credit (PTC) provides the greatest emissions 
reductions per dollar in the absence of climate policy. Every 
megawatt of wind power deployed results in a net reduction of 
496 tons of CO2 per year. Spending $1 billion on production 
[P]olicymakers are hoping to direct 
government spending over the next two 
years in a way that not only generates short-
term economic growth and employment 
but also addresses long-term policy 
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tax credits yields 1,466 megawatts of additional wind genera-
tion  capacity  and  cuts  CO2  emissions  by  727,700  tons  per 
year. Extending the PTC through 2012, as called for in current 
proposals, would result in an additional 13,400 megawatts of 
wind and cost tax payers $9.14 billion.10 But the cost effective-
ness of the PTC decreases if a price for carbon is introduced. 
Extending the PTC through 2012 with a cap-and-trade program 
taking effect that year (as called for under several proposals from 
the 110th Congress) would add only 5,800 more megawatts 
than in a scenario with just a cap-and-trade policy. With the 
PTC available to all renewable generation, the cost to taxpayers 
would grow to $24.8 billion and the amount of additional wind 
capacity per $1 billion in taxpayer dollars would decline to 234 
megawatts.
Smart  metering  investments  have  more  modest  emis-
sions benefits in the absence of climate policy or reforms to 
electricity billing. Installing advanced metering infrastructure 
(AMI) can help end-users to reduce consumption and utili-
ties to manage demand load. Under a cap-and-trade or carbon 
tax, the benefits of AMI and other smart-grid technologies 
increase  significantly  by  facilitating  large-scale  deployment 
of  plug-in  hybrids  and  renewable  energy  (Electric  Power 
Research Institute 2008). CCS demonstration projects, on the 
other hand, only make sense in the context of broader climate 
policy. Capturing and storing the CO2 from coal-fired power 
plants will not be economically efficient in the absence of a 
carbon price, and thus reducing the cost of CCS technology 
through demonstration projects is meaningless unless policy-
makers impose such a price down the road. 
Targeted transmission improvements exemplify the type 
of actions that could address infrastructure bottlenecks that 
threaten to obstruct other climate and energy goals. While new 
transmission capacity would have a marginal direct impact on 
emissions, they have the potential to enable significant reduc-
tions through the deployment of renewable sources of power. 
A recent study by the US Department of Energy (2008a) calls 
for 12,000 miles of new transmission lines, in concert with 
policy incentives for renewable energy, to allow wind energy 
to meet 20 percent of the country’s electricity needs by 2030. 
Although this level of wind generation would reduce annual 
CO2 emissions by as much as 225 million tons by 2030, the 
portion  directly  attributable  to  transmission  investment  is 
unclear (US DOE 2008a). Since the impact of transmission 
investment is much harder to quantify, it was not modeled 
for this policy brief. In addition, the type of intervention that 
could be undertaken as part of an economic recovery is similarly 
10. This cost estimate differs from House and Senate scoring of a PTC exten-
sion due to different assumptions about how much capacity will be created in 
response to the tax credit (United States Senate Committee on Finance 2009). 
difficult to identify. Studies by private industry have called for 
massive levels of grid construction, with cost estimates in the 
range of $20 billion to $40 billion (American Electric Power 
2009). However, addressing some of the regulatory hurdles 
that have stymied private investment in transmission over the 
past few decades, including uncertainty over ownership, cost 
allocation and recovery, state versus federal jurisdiction, and 
local siting and permitting, may be more important in moving 
these projects along than additional federal expenditures.
The building efficiency scenarios yield comparatively high 
emission  reductions  in  and  of  themselves  and  complement 
long-term  climate  policy  by  targeting  key  market  failures. 
Among the efficiency scenarios, providing funding to ensure 
that new school construction is green yields the largest emission 
reductions per dollar spent, as efficiency is easier and cheaper to 
achieve when designing a new building than when retrofitting 
an old one. Our household weatherization scenario is slightly 
less cost effective than retrofitting federal buildings because we 
allocated funding geographically according to past Weatheriza-
tion Assistance Program spending, rather than where the least-
cost opportunities lie from an energy standpoint.
All told, our green policy scenarios (excluding transmis-
sion investment and in the absence of climate policy) reduce 
annual CO2 emissions by 592,600 tons between 2012 and 
2020 for every billion dollars in government spending. This 
equates to a direct marginal abatement cost of $170 per ton 
if the reductions persist for one decade and $85 if they persist 
for two. This is considerably higher than the carbon price esti-
mates for prospective cap-and-trade programs in the United 
States  (EIA  2008c).  When  the  energy  cost  savings  to  the 
economy as a whole resulting from these programs are taken 
into account, however, the average marginal abatement cost 
becomes negative.
While the policy options assessed in this policy brief, 
if well designed and directly targeted, can reduce emissions 
they are limited in scale. Using the figure for average emis-
sion reductions per public dollar spent from above, $100 
billion  in  government  funds  directed  toward  energy  and 
environmental  programs  would  cut  annual  US  emissions 
by 59.3 million tons per year. While significant in absolute 
terms, this amounts to only 1 percent of total US emissions. 
Focusing funding on the programs with the highest returns 
could double this amount, but would still fall far short of 
the 484 million ton annual reduction that the EIA estimates 
would result from the Lieberman-Warner Act over the same 
period (EIA 2008c). Green recovery efforts will only make 
a  meaningful  dent  in  US  emissions  if  they  complement 
comprehensive climate policy.
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nongreen programs that will likely be a part of an economic 
recovery effort. Spending $1 billion on road construction and 
repair, for example, increases CO2 emissions by 35,400 tons per 
year, which cancels out just under half of the emissions reduc-
tion gains from spending the same amount on mass transit. If 
policymakers elected to spend as much on road construction 
as on a representative basket of green investments, roughly 6 
percent of the CO2 emissions reduction gains from the latter 
would be cancelled out. 
REDUCING DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN 
SOURCES OF ENERGY
Freeing the United States from its reliance on foreign oil was a 
staple theme of the 2008 presidential campaign and has become 
a rhetorical centerpiece of Washington’s current conception of 
a prospective green recovery. Reducing emissions and bolster-
ing energy security are often seen as two sides of the same coin11 
and policymakers hope that a recovery package can tackle both 
challenges simultaneously. Yet while our green policy scenarios 
all yield at least modest emissions reductions, they have more 
varied impacts on US energy imports (figure 3). And oil is not 
the only source of energy the United States buys from abroad: 
12 percent of natural gas consumption is supplied by imports. 
National security concerns surrounding gas imports, which 
come primarily from Canada and Mexico, and oil imports, 
a large portion of which come from the Middle East, differ 
considerably. As a result, we have broken down the impact 
of each scenario on overall US energy imports by fuel type 
(table 2). 
The biggest reduction in natural gas net imports comes 
from power generation scenarios that replace gas-fired power 
generation  with  alternatives.  Extending  the  PTC  has  the 
largest impact by using public funds to cover the additional 
cost of wind power relative to natural gas. Every $1 billion in 
tax credits spurs the installation of 1,466 megawatts of wind 
generation and 80 percent of the existing generation displaced 
when that wind capacity is brought online comes from natural 
gas. This reduces net gas imports by 5.3 billion cubic feet. 
CCS  demonstration  projects  also  have  a  meaningful,  but 
more modest impact, as more public money is required for 
each megawatt installed and only 69 percent of the displaced 
generation comes from natural gas (10 percent comes from 
nuclear).
None of the power generation scenarios, however, have 
much of an impact on US dependence on foreign oil, as oil 
is no longer commonly used to produce electricity. The only 
11. See, for example, Ladislaw et al. (2009). 
meaningful  reductions  in  US  oil  imports  come  from  our 
transportation scenarios. Every $1 billion spent on a Cash 
for Clunkers program, as defined in our model, reduces net 
imports of oil by 1.8 million barrels per year. The same amount 
spent on battery R&D reduces imports by 4 million barrels, 
assuming that the funding is sufficient to meet FreedomCAR 
goals. Mass transit investment has a more modest effect in 
our scenario (which assumes historic allocation of funding by 
region and mode), as oil consumed by buses offsets some of 
the gains made by getting vehicles off the road. Providing tax 
credits for conventional hybrid vehicles has a negligible effect 
as more than half of the drivers who take advantage of the tax 
credit would have purchased a hybrid anyway and a significant 
number of those for whom the credit would change purchase 
behavior would have otherwise purchased vehicles that can 
run on ethanol. 
On  average,  our  scenarios  reduce  net  imports  by  1.8 
billion cubic feet of gas and 0.9 million barrels of oil per year 
for every billion public dollars spent. Spending $100 billion 
on green programs could have a meaningful impact on US 
dependence on foreign sources of natural gas, reducing net 
imports by up to 6 percent, but would have almost no impact 
on US reliance on foreign oil if not done in conjunction with 
more  aggressive  energy  security  policy.  The  highest-impact 
scenario, battery R&D, can only absorb $1 billion, and there 
are only 11 million vehicles that would qualify for Cash for 
Clunkers vouchers (ACEEE 2009). Even if all 11 million were 
traded in, at a cost of $22 billion to the federal government, 
the program would only reduce oil imports by 39 million 
barrels per year, less than four days worth of US oil imports. As 
with efforts to address climate change, the real value of green 
recovery programs when it comes to improving US energy 
security is their ability to support long-term policy. Battery 
R&D, mass transit spending targeted at light rail or bus-rapid 
transit, and improvements in grid technology will help enable 
future policy to more effectively and cost-efficiently address 
energy security concerns.
While the jobs created by tax cuts and 
traditional infrastructure investment 
end once the money is spent, programs 
that reduce energy costs lead to net 
employment gains well into the futureN u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 3   Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 9
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POLICY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Our assessment of the employment, energy, and environmen-
tal benefits of a green economic recovery effort is intended as 
a theoretical framework for evaluating options and gauging 
potential results. For comparison purposes, we examine the 
impact of $1 billion in government spending for each program 
and assume normal responses to government incentives. In the 
current economic environment, however, “normal” responses 
may not occur and policymakers should keep the following 
considerations in mind when crafting and evaluating a green 
recovery package. 
Speed
The value of government spending in stimulating the economy 
depends on how quickly the money is put to work. Here our 
green recovery options vary greatly, both among themselves and 
compared to the alternatives. The building efficiency scenarios 
are likely to provide the most immediate stimulus value, as 
they leverage programs already in existence (the Weatheriza-
tion Assistance Program or the Federal Energy Management 
Program) and draw upon a currently underutilized construc-
tion industry. Smart meter deployment could also begin fairly 
quickly, particularly if new meters were installed as buildings 
are weatherized or retrofitted. Mass transit investments that 
are already planned and approved could start soon as well. 
A Cash for Clunkers program or hybrid tax credit could 
be implemented rapidly, though it would likely take time for 
a consumer response to build. Extending the production tax 
credit would not have much impact until 2010, as the PTC 
is available until the end of this year, and could even reduce 
wind investment in 2009 if developers have the option of 
waiting out the current credit crunch without losing the tax 
benefit. CCS demonstration projects and battery R&D are 
much longer-term initiatives, with little new spending likely 
to occur in either 2009 or 2010, and new transmission invest-
ments would likely be modest at first, given regulatory hurdles 
and uncertainty about future generation mix. 
Scale
In addition to the speed at which a program can be implement-
ed, the size to which it can be scaled is an important consid-
eration. As mentioned previously, some scenarios, like battery 
R&D, require only a few billion dollars at most. The potential 
scale of programs that rely on tax credits, like Cash for Clunk-
ers, ITC increases, and a PTC extension, depend entirely on 
consumer and firm response to government incentives and the 
tax appetite of the market. Given the current retrenchment 
in private consumption and investment, it is likely that tax 
credits will prove far less alluring than in a normal economic 
climate. This is particularly true of the PTC, which depends 
on businesses and investors having a significant tax burden to 
reduce in the first place. Given the collapse in profitability 
across the financial and energy sectors, many renewable proj-
ects are having trouble finding developers or external investors 
with profit margins necessary to absorb a 2.1 cent per kilowatt 
hour tax credit. A shift to “refundable” credits or direct grants 
would have the potential to encourage continued renewable 
deployment despite these economic circumstances. In short, 
there is considerable uncertainty about the degree to which 
traditional tax credits will stimulate households and businesses 
to spend in the absence of other incentives. 
Direct government spending on infrastructure investments 
or on building efficiency projects provide more certainty, but 
they are not without scale limitations. Only infrastructure proj-
ects that are fully planned, have received the necessary approval, 
and are simply waiting for funding can be expected to start 
within a timeframe relevant to economic stimulus efforts. For 
building efficiency programs, the federal agencies that handle 
household weatherization and federal retrofits have traditionally 
spent less than $1 billion each year.12 Channeling billions of 
dollars toward these projects in a way that yields meaningful 
economic, energy, and environmental results will require active 
attention by policymakers and smart government oversight.
Venue
The  speed  and  scale  at  which  prospective  green  recovery 
programs can be implemented should not be policymakers’ 
only  consideration  and  the  economic  recovery  effort  will 
almost certainly extend beyond the first legislative package. By 
all indications, an already lengthy recession is unlikely to ease 
before the end of the year (IMF 2009).13 Before then, the US 
Congress will not only pass an economic stimulus bill, but will 
also draft new energy and transportation bills and consider 
federal climate legislation. As Washington works to formulate 
more comprehensive energy and climate policy in a recession, 
the Obama administration and the congressional leadership 
12. For information on the Weatherization Assistance Program, see US 
DOE (2008d). For the Federal Energy Management Program, see US DOE 
(2008b).
13. See also Simon Johnson, “The Global Economy: Outlook, Risks, and 
the Implications for Policy,” testimony before the Senate Budget Committee, 
January 29, 2009, available at www.petersoninstitute.org (accessed on Febru-
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will need to look for options that meet energy security and 
emissions reduction goals while at the same time supporting 
economic recovery. They will need to strike a balance between 
programs that offer short-term economic gains and those that 
lay the foundation for longer-term economic strength. And 
they will need to coordinate domestic actions with those by 
other major economies around the world and look at how the 
response to the financial crisis at hand will affect multilateral 
efforts to prevent a climate crisis down the road.
LOOKING AHEAD AND ABROAD
The G-20 group of developed and developing countries has 
emerged as the lead forum for orchestrating an international 
response to the economic crisis. At their meeting last Novem-
ber, G-20 leaders pledged to work together to combat the global 
recession through coordinated fiscal stimulus. Washington is not 
alone in looking to meet long-term energy and environmental 
goals  while  bolstering  short-term  economic  growth.  Japan 
and South Korea have both trumpeted their stimulus plans as 
“Green New Deals,” China has earmarked much of its $586 
billion in spending for energy and environmental projects, and 
the United Kingdom and Germany have followed suit.14
 The G-20 will meet again in April to compare notes on 
the recovery effort and take stock of each country’s plan of 
attack. Leaders will be looking to coordinate their respective 
stimulus packages to ensure the greatest economic bang for 
the buck. Given that this same group of countries will be 
tackling climate change later in the year—either in a small 
grouping like the Major Economies Process, or through the 
UN-led negotiations in Copenhagen—they would be wise to 
assess the cumulative effect of these efforts on global carbon 
dioxide emissions and work together to ensure that various 
green stimulus efforts complement each other as well as long-
term emissions reduction goals. 
Discussion of the energy and environmental components 
of national recovery efforts provides three benefits:
1.  Investments by one country in an emerging low-carbon 
technology reduce the cost of that technology for everyone. 
Coordinating government-driven R&D and government-
funded demonstration projects can maximize the energy 
and environmental benefits of every public dollar spent.
2.  Efficiency investments that reduce energy demand in one 
country impact energy prices around the world and thus 
14. Michael Casey, “UN welcomes Korea, Japan green stimulus plans,” 
Associated Press, January 22, 2009; Li Jing, “NDRC: 350b yuan to pour into 
environment industry,” China Daily, November 27, 2008, available at www.
chinadaily.com.cn (accessed on February 2, 2009).
the  cost-benefit  analysis  used  by  national  policymakers 
when evaluating domestic programs. 
3.  The  cumulative  effects  of  green  recovery  programs  on 
national emissions will shape international climate negotia-
tions and the type of commitments that are made as part of 
a multilateral climate agreement.
Outside of specific green recovery programs, the inter-
national response to the global financial crisis overall, and to 
global economic imbalances in particular, will have a profound 
effect on the world’s energy and environmental trajectory. This 
is particularly true in the case of the United States and China, 
without which a solution to either the economic or the climate 
crisis is not possible.15 The macroeconomic imbalance between 
the two countries that emerged over the past decade (excessive 
US consumption financed by excessive Chinese savings and 
investment) is reflected in the two countries’ carbon footprints. 
American consumers purchased SUVs and McMansions on 
the back of cheap credit while Chinese industry overinvested 
in steel, cement, and aluminum production on the backs of 
Chinese household savings (Bergsten et al. 2008; Lardy 2008). 
As a result, more than 70 percent of US CO2 emissions come 
from consumer-related activities while more than 70 percent 
of Chinese emissions come from industry (Rosen and Houser 
2007).
The  current  crisis  is  already  unwinding  some  of  these 
economic  and  environmental  imbalances.  At  the  close  of 
2008, US oil demand had fallen 6 percent as consumers tight-
ened their belts, and electricity demand in China was down by 
10 percent as energy-intensive industries cut production (EIA 
2009b).16 A smart response to the crisis can perpetuate these 
trends. Future US consumption will be greener, and the cost 
of climate policy reduced, if US recovery efforts weatherize 
homes, upgrade the electricity grid, and help improve auto-
motive fuel efficiency. If China takes advantage of the crisis 
to consolidate heavy industry, improve its energy efficiency, 
and free up investment capital for lighter manufacturing and 
services, then it will emerge from the crisis with a growth 
model that pollutes less and employs more. 
This is not to say that energy and the environment should 
be a central item on the agenda for the April G-20 meeting in 
London. The heads of state and finance ministers present will 
have their hands full shoring up the global financial system 
and boosting global economic growth. But by discussing the 
15. See Trevor Houser, “Finding Agreement on Climate in a Crisis,” Project 
Syndicate, December 23, 2008, available at www.petersoninstitute.org 
(accessed on February 2, 2009).
16. Chinese electricity demand data are from the China Electricity Council 
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energy  and  environmental  implications  of  those  recovery 
efforts  under  consideration  and  already  undertaken,  G-20 
leaders can help to maximize the value of their domestic green 
stimulus programs, improve the chances that a global recovery 
will be sustainable, and build faith in the stability of the global 
economy and global climate negotiations.17
APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY
To assess the energy and environmental impact of our green 
recovery programs, we used the Energy Information Adminis-
tration’s (EIA) National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).18 
With its extremely detailed model of the energy impacts of 
US consumer and business behavior both by region of the 
country and sector of the economy, NEMS is the preeminent 
tool for forecasting US energy demand and is used to create 
the Department of Energy’s official Annual Energy Outlook 
(AEO). We have modified NEMS to simulate each program 
included  in  the  study.19  We  modeled  our  policy  scenarios 
using the just-released AEO 2009 version of NEMS to capture 
recent changes in policy, energy prices, and technology costs.20 
We also modeled each scenario using the modifications to the 
NEMS model made last year by the EIA to simulate the impact 
of  the  Lieberman-Warner  Climate  Security  Act  (S.2191).21 
This allows for an assessment of how programs included in a 
green recovery package would impact the cost and contours of 
climate policy down the road.
Our modeling differed from that of the EIA in one respect: 
We  did  not  use  the  proprietary  macroeconomic  module 
(MAM), which is supplied to EIA by the company Global 
Insight but is unavailable to the public. Running NEMS with 
the MAM turned off means that macroeconomic feedback 
effects from changes in energy supply, demand, and price are 
not captured. We compared our reference case AEO 2009 
forecast without the MAM to EIA’s AEO 2009 reference case 
and found a difference of only 0.01 percent in energy demand 
in 2020. Given the scope of this difference and the limited size 
of our policy interventions, we believe that the inclusion of 
17. The UK government has highlighted the need to address the energy and 
environmental implications of the economic recovery ahead of the London 
G-20 summit (The London Summit 2009).
18. For documentation on the NEMS, see EIA (2007). 
19. The transmission scenario, however, is difficult to model as an independent 
policy intervention given current NEMS architecture. Instead, we opted for a 
qualitative discussion of transmission investment based on a review of existing 
literature. 
20. See EIA (2009a). AEO 2009 includes policy changes in the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.
21. See EIA (2008c). 
MAM would not meaningfully impact our findings.
It is important to keep in mind that the NEMS model 
is a tool for understanding possible scenarios, not forecast-
ing  definitive  outcomes.  Energy  markets  are  impacted  by 
myriad elements that are volatile in nature. Each year, changes 
in energy prices, policy, consumer behavior, and technology 
costs result in significant revisions to previous Annual Energy 
Outlooks. In addition, each policy scenario was modeled in 
isolation. In practice, several of the policy options we assessed 
will likely be adopted in concert, which could change the over-
all results. Below is an explanation of the changes to NEMS 
made to assess each scenario, grouped by category.
Building Efficiency
In NEMS, residential and commercial floor space are disag-
gregated according to census division and building type.22 To 
model efficiency improvements in a given number of build-
ings in a particular group, we increased the efficiency of the 
group as a whole proportionate to the floor space occupied by 
buildings actually impacted. For example, to improve the shell 
efficiency of 5 million single-family homes in New England by 
5 percent, we would improve the shell efficiency of the entire 
stock of 107 million single-family homes in the region by 
0.234 percent. This approximation reduces aggregate energy 
demand by the same amount as improving the efficiency of 
the 5 million homes in question, and hence yields equivalent 
effects on energy prices and other related variables.
Household Weatherization 
The basis of  our  household  weatherization scenario is past 
experience from the US Department of Energy’s Weatheriza-
tion Assistance Program.23 To calculate the energy savings per 
dollar spent by region from improving air sealing and insu-
lation and installing programmable thermostats (not smart 
meters), we relied on assessments made by the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL) and adjusted to present dollars 
using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ consumer price index 
(Schweitzer and Eisenberg 2002).
In  NEMS,  homes  are  classified  by  census  region  and 
building type and grouped by pre-2006 and post-2005 stock. 
We improved the shell efficiency of 3.8 million single-family 
homes  of  pre-2006  stock  to  reflect  the  overall  efficiency 
22. Homes are classified as single-family, multifamily, and mobile households. 
Commercial buildings are classified in 11 types (EIA 2008a).
23. For information on the Weatherization Assistance Program, see US DOE 
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improvements  resulting  from  our  basket  of  weatherization 
measures (per the ORNL study). These weatherization proj-
ects  were  distributed  across  census  divisions  based  on  past 
Weatherization Assistance Program funding, and our assump-
tions regarding the average energy efficiency improvement and 
cost were tailored to the region in which the home is situated. 
The average cost per home is $1,640, resulting in an overall 
program cost of $6.2 billion, the amount called for in H.R. 1, 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, as of 
January 26, 2009 (CBO 2009). We assume that all weather-
ization is completed by the end of 2010.
Federal Building Retrofits
Our  underlying  estimate  of  the  energy  impact  of  every 
dollar spent retrofitting federal buildings is drawn from the 
US Department of Energy’s experience with Energy Saving 
Performance  Contracts  (ESPCs)  under  the  Federal  Energy 
Management  Program  (FEMP).24  FEMP  has  assessed  the 
energy  savings  resulting  from  195  ESPCs  since  1998  and 
calculates an average energy savings of 8,311 BTU per dollar 
invested (US DOE 2008c). Based on this, they estimate that 
reducing the energy demand of all federal buildings by 20 
percent would cost $9.4 billion.25
We used this as the basis for our modeled scenario. In 
NEMS, government buildings are treated as commercial build-
ings and we estimated that federal buildings account for 4.6 
percent of total commercial energy use. Based on FEMP’s esti-
mates, spending $10 billion on retrofits would reduce energy 
demand from federal buildings by 83.1 trillion BTU, which 
equals a reduction in overall commercial energy demand of 
0.96 percent. This is the adjustment we make in the model, 
lowering commercial energy demand by 0.96 percent across 
building types and regions starting in 2010. 
Green School Construction
For this scenario, we improved the energy efficiency of new 
school construction between 2009 and 2011. Our estimates 
of the cost of greening new schools and the resulting energy 
savings  were  drawn  from  a  Capital  E  study  from  October 
2006, which evaluated 30 green school construction projects 
around the country (Kats 2006). The study finds that improv-
ing energy efficiency by 33.4 percent adds 1.65 percent to 
the construction cost. Our estimates of total annual school 
construction activity and average construction costs are drawn 
24. For information on FEMP, see US DOE (2008b).
25. Based on authors’ correspondence with FEMP analysts, December 22, 
2008.
from School Planning and Management’s 2008 Annual School 
Report (Abramson 2008). 
We  used  these  estimates,  broken  down  by  region,  to 
calculate the marginal cost of making all schools built between 
2009 and 2011 green, a total of just under $1 billion. NEMS 
classifies educational buildings within the commercial module, 
which allows us to reduce the energy demand by the stock of 
educational buildings in 2011 to reflect the impact of green-
ing new school construction. We tailored these estimates to 
each  census  division,  by  adjusting  the  regional  definitions 
in Abramson (2008) to those in NEMS based on school-age 
population estimates by state from the US Census Bureau’s 
Population Division (2008). This yields an energy efficiency 
improvement in the total stock of educational buildings of 
between 0.58 and 2.08 percent depending on census divi-
sion.
Power Generation
We included five electricity-sector scenarios in this study, four 
of  which  we  model  through  NEMS  (PTC  extension,  ITC 
increase, CCS demonstration projects, and smart metering) 
and one for which we can only provide a qualitative assess-
ment (the transmission scenario). We provide our methodol-
ogy on the four modeled scenarios below.
Production Tax Credit (PTC) Extension
NEMS has a dedicated PTC-input variable for each qualifying 
technology. We extended the PTC at current rates (adjusted 
annually  for  inflation)  for  three  years  for  qualifying  renew-
able energy technologies, which results in extensions through 
the end of 2012 for wind power and through the end of 2013 
for  biomass,  geothermal,  municipal  waste,  and  hydropower. 
NEMS  uses  this  input  to  forecast  electricity-sector  capacity 
additions, comparing the cost of renewable energy technolo-
gies (after accounting for the PTC) with other forms of power 
On average, our green recovery scenarios 
save the economy $450 million per 
year for every $1 billion invested, a 
sort of “efficiency pay-go” provision 
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generation.26 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC) Increase
NEMS also allows for adjustments in the ITC, which allows 
power producers, businesses, and households to claim a tax 
credit for a portion of the investment cost of renewable-genera-
tion capacity. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008 extended the ITC for most technologies through 2016. 
For our scenario, we increase the percentage of renewable energy 
investment that qualifies for a tax credit to 45 percent between 
2009 and 2012 and remove the dollar limit. After 2012, the 
ITC returns to existing policy as of December 2008.
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Demonstration Projects
The electricity planning submodule in NEMS allows for the 
modeling of unplanned capacity additions. Such additions are 
usually used to force certain electricity generating technologies, 
such as renewable energy technologies, to meet a power genera-
tion mix mandated by policymakers. For our scenario, we added 
10 CCS demonstration projects, using integrated gasification 
combined cycle (IGCC) technology to the unplanned capacity 
additions to simulate their effect on long-term generation mix, 
energy prices, and CO2 emissions. Each plant has a name-plate 
capacity of 500 MW and our ten projects were geographically 
dispersed. Given the time required to plan and deploy CCS proj-
ects, we assumed a gradual phase-in between 2011 and 2015.
Estimates of the additional cost of installing and operat-
ing CCS on an IGCC plant were drawn from a recent report 
from the Pew Center on Global Climate Change (Kuuskraa 
2007). We selected the “high cost” assumptions to reflect an 
increase in CCS cost estimates since the study was published 
in 2007.
Smart Metering
The term “smart grid” does not refer to a single technology 
or policy intervention, but rather to a suite of software, hard-
ware, infrastructure, and business practices. For our scenario, 
we assessed the impact of deploying advanced metering infra-
structure (AMI), a smart metering technology, on residential 
energy demand. Our cost estimates of installing the household 
meters, network software, and power distribution hardware as 
part of AMI deployment were based on a survey of existing 
AMI initiatives. We found an average cost of $226 per house-
26. Electricity capacity planning is a part of the Electricity Market Module of 
NEMS. For more information, see EIA (2008b).
hold included in a smart metering initiative. 
Our estimates of the electricity savings that result from 
AMI deployment were drawn from a recent study by the Elec-
tric Power Research Institute (EPRI 2008). We adopted EPRI’s 
assumptions of the degree to which AMI facilitates a reduc-
tion in line losses and a change in behavior by end-users when 
deployed to 5 percent of households. We then reduced residen-
tial electricity demand in NEMS based on these calculations. A 
5 percent residential deployment means installing meters in 5.8 
million homes at a cost of $1.3 billion. We assumed 50/50 cost 
sharing between the public and private sector.
Transportation
We included five transportation scenarios in this study, four 
of which were green (hybrid tax credit, Cash for Clunkers, 
battery R&D, and mass transit) and one that was not (road 
construction). 
Hybrid Tax Credit
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 provided tax credits for the 
first 60,000 hybrid vehicles a manufacturer sells, after which 
the credit is phased out (IRS 2007). As of January 2009, tax 
credits have been phased out for Honda, Toyota, and Lexus 
(Fuel Economy 2009). In our scenario, we raised the tax credit 
on all hybrid vehicles to $2500 and extended it through 2011, 
regardless of how many hybrids are sold. We held overall car 
sales constant to assess the extent to which the credit changes 
consumers’ vehicle preferences and the energy and environmen-
tal results of this. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008 put in place even larger tax credits for plug-in hybrid 
vehicles, so we limited our scenario to conventional hybrids. 
Cash for Clunkers
Our Cash for Clunkers scenario was modeled on a proposal 
from the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Econo-
my (ACEEE 2009), which calls for a government rebate of 
between $1500 and $4500 for drivers who scrap a vehicle with 
a fuel economy of less than 18 miles per gallon and purchase 
a new or used vehicle with a fuel economy that is at least 25 
percent above current CAFÉ standards. The voucher could 
also be used for public transportation. Given the way NEMS 
aggregates the US passenger vehicle fleet and treats consumer 
preference, modeling this scenario by modifying the NEMS 
was not feasible. Instead, we adopted ACEEE’s assumptions 
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or used cars or to use public transportation and the resulting 
improvement in the average fuel economy of the passenger 
vehicle fleet, with one modification: We assumed that half of 
the drivers trading in old cars would have purchased a new or 
used vehicle regardless, based on the experience of Cash for 
Clunkers programs in California (Dill 2004). For these driv-
ers, we take the difference between the average fuel economy of 
new vehicles and those that would qualify under the ACEEE’s 
proposal and ascribe this to the program. We calculated the 
CO2 emissions and energy import reductions, as well as the 
energy cost savings, using the AEO 2009 reference-case data 
to make it consistent with our other scenarios. 
The drawback of this approach is that it did not capture 
the change in energy prices that results from a decrease in 
demand or the change in energy demand that results from a 
decrease in prices. As a result, we expect our scenario to slightly 
overestimate changes in oil imports and CO2 emissions and to 
underestimate energy cost savings. 
Battery R&D
This scenario differs from the other eleven scenarios in that 
it  assumed  a  target  outcome  rather  than  a  specific  policy 
intervention. Our objective was to meet the goals laid out by 
the US Department of Energy’s FreedomCAR program for 
reducing lithium-ion battery cost and weight.27 In the AEO 
2009 version on NEMS, EIA for the first time fully integrated 
plug-in hybrid (PHEV) battery cost and weight calculations 
into the consumer-vehicle choice and manufacturers-technol-
ogy choice submodules. Their current assumptions are that 
FreedomCAR will fall far short of meeting its goals. For our 
scenario, we posited that tripling the program’s funding would 
enable it to reach these goals, and adjusted the battery cost and 
weight calculations in NEMS to reflect this. This assumption 
may prove incorrect, and the cost effectiveness of the govern-
ment spending associated with the program could increase or 
decrease dramatically. 
We used NEMS to calculate the increase in PHEV sales 
resulting from the battery cost and weight reductions but we 
did not include the NEMS estimates of the energy and envi-
ronmental implications of these reductions. This is the first year 
that the EIA has attempted to comprehensively model the inter-
action between PHEVs and the electrical grid, and their meth-
odology has not yet been peer reviewed. We chose instead to use 
estimates of the CO2 and oil-demand implications of greater 
PHEV penetration from a recent EPRI study (2007), adjusted 
for AEO 2009 projections of oil prices, import dependency, 
27. For information on this program, see Howell (2007). 
vehicle efficiency, and CO2-intensity of power generation. 
As with the Cash for Clunkers scenario, the approach 
adopted in this scenario did not capture the change in energy 
prices that results from a decrease in demand or the change 
in energy demand that results from a decrease in prices. We 
therefore again expect our scenario to slightly overestimate 
changes in oil imports and CO2 emissions and to underesti-
mate energy cost savings. 
Mass Transit
To assess the energy and environmental implications of mass 
transit  investment,  we  started  by  estimating  the  impact  of 
government-funded  capital  investment  on  passenger-miles 
travelled.  The  Federal Transit  Administration  tracks  nation-
wide  investment  in  and  utilization  of  mass  transit  through 
the National Transit Database (2008). The American Public 
Transportation Association (APTA) compiles key statics from 
this  database  each  year  and  makes  it  available  through  its 
Public Transportation Fact Book (2008). From this resource, we 
calculated  the  ratio  between  nationwide  incremental  capital 
investment and incremental usage in all public transit modes to 
evaluate the impact of government spending on passenger-miles 
travelled. We estimated that $10 billion in government spend-
ing would be matched by $3.77 billion in private funding for 
capital projects, and that the combined amount would increase 
passenger-miles travelled on mass transit by 2.4 percent.
We calculated the corresponding decline in vehicle-miles 
travelled by car based on a study by ICF International (Bailey 
2007).  Based  on  these  findings,  we  made  adjustments  in 
NEMS to the passenger-miles travelled by mass transit and 
vehicle-miles travelled by car, allocated regionally based on 
current mass-transit utilization. To mirror the methodology 
used for our road construction scenario (discussed below), we 
assumed a five-year ramp-up in these effects.
Road Construction
Increases in the quantity and quality of roads have frequently 
been found to encourage greater growth in vehicle miles trav-
eled (vmt) than would have otherwise occurred.28 Most of 
the existing literature has focused on the vmt implications of 
increases in miles of road lanes. However, even improvements 
in  the  quality  of  highways  have  been  observed  to  impact 
driving  behavior.  The  Federal  Highway  Administration’s 
(FHWA) Highway Economic Requirements System (HERS) 
is frequently used to evaluate the aggregate impact on the state 
28. For a review of studies analyzing the relationship between road quality/
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of the US highway system resulting from various capital-expen-
diture scenarios.29 The model is uniquely suited to this analysis 
because it includes travel demand elasticity features that can 
project driving behavior resulting from modeled changes to 
the state of the highway system. For this analysis, we relied on 
exhibits 9-6 and 9-7 from the FHWA’s 2004 Conditions and 
Performance Report to correlate vmt and vmt-growth rates with 
various investment scenarios (US DOT 2004).30 We used this 
data to interpolate the vmt impacts of potential capital invest-
ments of $30 billion (the amount modeled in this scenario) 
and used this as the basis to modify NEMS assumptions. 
It should be noted that HERS optimizes federal spending 
to fund only the most cost-effective projects at a given expen-
diture level. As naïve as it may be to think that any federal 
highway allocations will be spent only on the most cost-effec-
tive projects, a massive one-time stimulus may be open to even 
greater inefficiency. If spending is unable to achieve the road 
improvements projected by the model, vmt increases would 
likely be lower than presented here. 
Exhibit 9-7 correlates average annual highway spending 
with projected vmt. However, a stimulus package would be 
structured as a short-term spike in spending rather than a 
sustained change to annual expenditures. In this analysis, we 
assumed that a one-time stimulus of $30 billion would have 
the same scale of impact as a $1.5 billion increase in average 
annual expenditures spread over 20 years. However, in order 
to adjust the timing of vmt impacts to more closely match the 
funding structure of a fiscal stimulus, we have frontloaded the 
estimated vmt impacts. In general, the HERS model assumes 
29. For a description of the HERS model, see FHWA (2008).
30. In its 2006 Conditions and Performance Report, the FHWA adjusted HERS 
to reflect the assumption that highway expenditures are funded through levies 
imposed on drivers (e.g., gas taxes). As a result, increases in vmt resulting from 
improved roads are partially offset through increases in direct costs associated 
with driving on those roads. Since a fiscal stimulus would probably not be 
funded through such levies, we have sourced all data from the 2004 Conditions 
and Performance Report, rather than the more recent 2006 report.
that 80 percent of vmt impacts will take effect within 5 years, 
and 100 percent of vmt impacts will take effect within 20 years 
(Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2008). When modeling a 
$30 billion stimulus, we assumed that 80 percent of the maxi-
mum reductions achieved through a sustained funding change 
of $1.5 billion per year would occur within the first five years. 
We assumed that 100 percent of the vmt impacts would have 
occurred by year 20.
It is likely that at least some of the projects funded through 
a fiscal stimulus would merely accelerate projects that would 
have been funded in later years under business-as-usual condi-
tions. It is thus possible that a large stimulus may displace 
future federal funding for highway maintenance and expan-
sion, thus reducing the vmt impact of a stimulus. However, 
in order to be consistent with the modeling approach taken 
in other portions of this analysis, we have chosen to assume 
that all stimulus spending is entirely additional to business-as-
usual expenditures and projects. As a result, this analysis may 
present a modest overestimate of vmt impacts of a stimulus.
Modeling Employment
To  estimate  the  employment  impacts  of  our  green  policy 
scenarios, we relied primarily on RIMS II multipliers from 
the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis  (BEA  2008).  RIMS  II 
allows the estimation of the number of jobs created for one 
year in a specific industry for every $1 million increase in final 
demand for that industry’s goods and services based on the 
BEA’s national input-output data. We used 2006 multipliers, 
which are only available at a 60-industry aggregate level. The 
drawback of this approach is that all utilities are aggregated as 
one industry, which does not allow for a comparison of the 
net employment effects of switching between types of power 
generation.31 
To  address  this,  we  relied  on  the  National  Renewable 
Energy Laboratory’s (NREL) JEDI database to calculate the 
employment effects of the energy results from the NEMS analy-
sis. JEDI uses a “bill-of-goods” approach to input-output based 
employment multipliers and is updated regularly to reflect actu-
al project-development costs and labor-content requirements 
(NREL 2009). JEDI provides estimates for coal, wind, natural 
gas, ethanol, and concentrated solar thermal generation. For 
solar photovoltaic and biomass, we relied on a study from the 
Renewable Energy Policy Project (Singh and Fehrs 2001). For 
nuclear power, we relied on a Nuclear Energy Institute (2008) 
31. See Kammen, Kapadia, and Fripp (2004) for a good discussion of the 
methodological challenges in assessing the labor impacts of energy policy 
changes.
Outside of specific green recovery programs, 
the international response to the global 
financial crisis overall, and to global 
economic imbalances in particular, will 
have a profound effect on the world’s 
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assessment of the North Anna Power Station.
In  estimating  the  employment  effects  of  energy  cost 
savings to households, we used the RIMS II multipliers for 
household consumption. For energy savings that occur during 
the  first  three  years  of  the  program,  we  assumed  that  50 
percent would be spent and the rest saved. Longer-term, we 
assumed that whatever is saved ultimately is put to work in the 
economy through investment, which we assumed has the same 
employment multiplier as household expenditures.32 Balanced 
against these employment gains are the corresponding losses in 
the energy sector from foregone revenue. We calculated these 
using JEDI and the other input-output based energy-sector 
employment studies mentioned above.
32. For a good background discussion of the employment effects of energy 
efficiency, see Scott, Roop, and Shultz (2002); Scott et al. (2004); and Roland-
Holst (2008).
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Figure 1     Total employment effects—job-years created through $1 billion in government investment














  Initial investment–Public dollars
  Initial investment–Private dollars
  Long-term energy effects*
* Long-term energy effects measures the net change in employment (measured in job-years) resulting from energy savings and the change in energy mix 
for the decade following the initial investment.
** For tax cuts, the lighter field indicates the employment effects of the share of the intitial tax cut or rebate saved until future years.
–N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 3   Fe b r uArY   2 0 0 9
0
Figure 2     Economic and environmental impact of recovery policy options—reduction in annual energy 
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Figure 3     Economic and energy security impact of recovery policy options—reduction in annual oil  
  imports (X-axﾭis), natural gas imports (Y-axﾭis), and job creation (circle size) for every  
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